Research Summary
I address three main puzzles in my research so far, using a mixed methods approach. First, I study why states do not design more constraining arms control agreements. This is puzzling because states spend so much time and resources negotiating these agreements, only for some of them to be ineffective at controlling the spread of nuclear and other related weapons technologies. I argue and find support for the notion that a state's threat environment influences their arms control agreement design preferences, with different sources of threat leading to different design preferences. In addition to a statistical analysis, I find support for my argument using two case studies, including one that focuses on U.S.-Soviet negotiations over arms control agreements in the 1970s and another case study that focuses on recent negotiations over Iran's nuclear program and the role of the United States and Israel in the negotiation process. For more information see the "Dangerous Design" paper below.
Next, I focus on the consequences of the failure to design more constraining arms control agreements, specifically focusing on why states have tested so many nuclear weapons when there has been a longstanding appetite in the international community for completely banning nuclear weapons tests, including through the use of arms control agreements. I argue and find support for the idea that nuclear powers are hesitant to ban nuclear weapons tests because they use nuclear weapons tests as part of a brinkmanship strategy during international crises, with the winner being determined by which state tested more nuclear weapons during the crisis. Once again, I use both statistical analyses and a case study of the 1969 Soviet-Chinese Border Crisis to support my argument. For more information see the "Testing for Victory" paper below.
Finally, I continue to focus on the consequences of the failure to design more constraining arms control agreements, but this time focus on how it can lead to increased cooperation between the United States and potential nuclear proliferators. As the leader of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, the United States attempts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by using a mix of positive and negative policies, such as military assistance, economic assistance, or economic sanctions, in order to induce potential proliferators to reverse or slow down their nuclear programs. This paper explains why the United States specifically employs different mixes of positive and negative inducements for different types of potential proliferators, with the specific mix of policies depending on the type of potential proliferator, and that proliferator’s relationship with the United States. While this paper is still being worked on, I plan on using statistical analyses and case studies of the United States' relationship with different types of potential nuclear proliferators to evaluate my argument. Understanding why the U.S. favors different policy mixes over others will allow policy makers and scholars to better understand the United States' approach to nuclear nonproliferation.
Next, I focus on the consequences of the failure to design more constraining arms control agreements, specifically focusing on why states have tested so many nuclear weapons when there has been a longstanding appetite in the international community for completely banning nuclear weapons tests, including through the use of arms control agreements. I argue and find support for the idea that nuclear powers are hesitant to ban nuclear weapons tests because they use nuclear weapons tests as part of a brinkmanship strategy during international crises, with the winner being determined by which state tested more nuclear weapons during the crisis. Once again, I use both statistical analyses and a case study of the 1969 Soviet-Chinese Border Crisis to support my argument. For more information see the "Testing for Victory" paper below.
Finally, I continue to focus on the consequences of the failure to design more constraining arms control agreements, but this time focus on how it can lead to increased cooperation between the United States and potential nuclear proliferators. As the leader of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, the United States attempts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by using a mix of positive and negative policies, such as military assistance, economic assistance, or economic sanctions, in order to induce potential proliferators to reverse or slow down their nuclear programs. This paper explains why the United States specifically employs different mixes of positive and negative inducements for different types of potential proliferators, with the specific mix of policies depending on the type of potential proliferator, and that proliferator’s relationship with the United States. While this paper is still being worked on, I plan on using statistical analyses and case studies of the United States' relationship with different types of potential nuclear proliferators to evaluate my argument. Understanding why the U.S. favors different policy mixes over others will allow policy makers and scholars to better understand the United States' approach to nuclear nonproliferation.
Under Review
"Testing for Victory: Nuclear weapons tests, brinkmanship, and nuclear crisis outcomes."
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Working Papers
"Dangerous Design: Threat and Arms Control Agreement Design."
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